

August 2008



HM Inspection Report

British Transport Police
Serious and Organised Crime

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Intelligence

Summary – The force has insufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands for this area of activity or to supply dynamic intelligence products that channel the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to its regional intelligence unit (RIU), with two staff based in the London RIU and an ongoing programme to link information technology (IT).

Strengths

- There is a total of 43 analyst posts (including two temporary analysts for the organised crime group(OCG) and cable theft) and 20 researcher posts established across the force. There are also seven temporary researchers. Within the force intelligence bureau (FIB) and area intelligence bureaux (AIBs) there are crime thematic focus desks that consider level 2 issues as they emerge. In addition, some crime units have a dedicated analyst; examples include the economic crime unit (ECU) and Operation Drum.
- There is a principal analyst based at force headquarters (FHQ) with head of profession responsibilities for the analyst function. The principal analyst has arranged professional forums for analysts within BTP to discuss new innovations and areas of common interest.
- A full range of National Intelligence Model (NIM) products is produced, and good work is undertaken in the mapping of OCGs at both force and area level. These OCGs are prioritised through an organisational harm matrix and tasked and monitored through the level 2 tasking and co-ordination meeting. All area intelligence bureaux (AIBs) have had personal briefings on serious and organised crime and the OCG mapping programme.

Work in progress

- BTP has recognised the need for the FIB to play a greater role in driving activity on major crime and serious and organised crime. The force has recently agreed plans to restructure the FIB to reflect the identified force level 2 crime priorities, which will result in significant additional investment. The proposed plan will deliver six focus desks, each comprising an analyst, a researcher and a field intelligence officer covering graffiti, football related crime, cable and metal theft (Operation Drum), violence/sexual crime, drugs and theft of personal property (TPP). This will represent a significant resource investment and ensure that sufficient analysis and intelligence capacity exists to meet the demand at level 2 and produce the associated products. It will require investment in both analytical and research capacity. If delivered successfully, this will enhance the effectiveness of force tasking and subsequent activity against major crime and serious and organised crime. The intention is for these reforms to be put in place by 1 July 2008, with recruitment for new posts being undertaken immediately.

Areas for improvement

- Economic crime, particularly payment card crime, is identified by the force strategic assessment (FSA) as a priority crime category and, as such, requires the necessary dedicated analytical assets to deliver effective performance. The ECU is a major contributor to force activity against OCGs; however, the unit has only one analyst and no researchers or field intelligence officers. This limits the capacity of the unit to address serious and organised fraud against the network, and any associated criminality this may be funding. In the proposed restructure of the FIB, the force must ensure its

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analytical assets best match the OCG threat, and additional support to the ECU should be considered a priority in this change

- The career structure for analysts is currently unclear and limited, leading to high levels of attrition as staff pursue options externally. While remuneration is clearly an issue, analysts report that there is a lack of a bespoke career structure and a limited understanding of their role and products from line management. The rate of attrition has a significant impact on the morale of staff, the quality of product and the financial costs associated with recruiting and training new staff. There is scope to enhance the role and function of the force principal analyst in addressing these important areas. Providing clear direction and meaningful support to analysts through a structured career development programme and a meaningful quality assurance regime will have a significant impact on morale and retention. A number of forces that have close working arrangements with BTP, including the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and City of London Police (CoLP), have faced similar challenges and the force should consider learning from their experience.

Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 crimes and OCGs through partnerships. This is assessed to be embryonic. The force has made a proportionate contribution to national assessments, in that its support to the national picture is adequate.

Strengths

- BTP seeks intelligence with partners at both strategic and operational level. At strategic level, partnership intelligence is cited as part of the force intelligence requirement for identified crime priorities within serious and organised crime. Partnership contribution is embedded within operational teams both at FHQ and area level, through informal mechanisms and the corporate tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG) process. All analysts and researchers have access to open and closed source intelligence material.
- There are formal protocols in place with 14 Home Office forces, and established working arrangements in place with the remaining forces. In addition, there are formal agreements in place with railway-specific bodies and the banking sector. These arrangements are often data led, with bespoke intelligence requirements agreed for operational matters as required. Notable examples reported by partners as effective include Operation Bush and Operation Flatline, where BTP has led joint initiatives with Home Office forces, railway partners and the banking sector to tackle level 2 OCGs attacking automatic teller machines (ATMs) through fraud and theft.
- BTP is supportive of and contributes to the regional intelligence unit (RIU) structure and has placed two staff in the London RIU.
- Good working relationships exist between the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and specialist crime units, notably the ECU, where joint fraud and money-laundering operations have been undertaken.

Work in progress

- Existing partnership intelligence exchange tends to be via bulk data transfers rather than through response to bespoke requirement. Recent changes to information technology (IT) by many Home Office forces has reduced access to partner intelligence systems.

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BTP is seeking funded inclusion from the Home Office into the national intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking project (IMPACT), which would resolve many of these issues; however, interim solutions are also being sought with key partners including the MPS. To this end, a small team of three staff is dedicated to IMPACT nominal index within the FIB; however, timelines for this are unclear as yet. Given its significance, this work would benefit from a force-level working group to co-ordinate and drive activity.

- BTP is in the process of seeking access to the Identity and Passport Service OMNIBASE information system.

Area(s) for improvement

- Contribution to and from Home Office forces to the BTP intelligence picture is ad hoc. The FIB should provide a strategic direction for partnership activity based on BTP's intelligence requirement. This should provide an overarching and sustainable framework for developing corporate information-sharing protocols.
- The force has limited understanding of OCGs utilising the railway network to facilitate their activity. There is clearly a threat to staff and passengers from OCGs using the network to transport illegal products; however, this area remains relatively unexplored by the force. This should be considered as a priority if the force is to accurately assess the true scale of OCG activity within its network.
- While BTP had an intelligence-sharing arrangement in place with Her Majesty's Customs and Excise, this has not continued since its merger with the Inland Revenue. There is a need for this to be developed as it was a productive source of intelligence.

Summary – The FSA analyses the trends in relation to level 2 criminality comprehensively. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly progressive. Tactical intelligence products are comprehensive and problem profiles are in place for priority crimes. There is evidence of analysis to anticipate future criminality trends or problems.

Strengths

- A full range of NIM intelligence products is generated by BTP in accordance with national standards. The FSA is informed by the National Strategic Assessment and UK Threat Assessment on organised crime and covers key serious and organised crime types, including Class A drugs, organised immigration crime and gun crime. The FSA considers and incorporates current and emerging threats and the impact of serious and organised crime in the future.
- The FSA goes to the police authority for scrutiny prior to reaching the force strategic tasking and co-ordination group for approval and the consequential publication of the force control strategy. Serious and organised crime is integrated within the FSA, with detailed focus on level 2 focus crimes.
- The force control strategy sets out force level 2 focus crimes – terrorism, graffiti, economic crime, cable and other metal thefts, drugs supply and football related crime, together with other force priority crime categories – route crime, trespass, disruption, violence, volume acquisitive crime and anti-social behaviour. To support these, the force

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control strategy sets out intelligence, prevention and enforcement (IPE) activity deemed necessary to address these priority themes.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- While BTP has defined crime themes through its publication *What is Serious and Organised Crime in BTP?*, partners would welcome further guidance on the extent to which units pursue such investigations. Specific concern was raised regarding the often complex and extended nature of fraud and money-laundering inquiries, which often reveal offences falling outside the direct railway community. The force should consider defining their position to partners in relation to such investigations.

Summary – The force trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and areas. There is a full trigger plan for hot briefing whenever a significant change in either the threat or the nature of the analysis points to a need for a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols exist with key partners, such as Home Office forces and rail industry bodies. The force can only in part demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- The FSA is shared, and agreed in consultation, with rail industry partners. It is promulgated across the organisation via chief officer and senior management team (SMT) leads together with the FIB. Specific intelligence requirements will be sought from partners and areas through established tasking and co-ordination forums as well as in line with specific operational needs. However, further intelligence updates on level 2 themes are limited.
- In addition to the FIB, each area has an intelligence capability (AIBs), but these have a clear geographic focus and are not always sighted on the corporate intelligence picture relating to, for example, OCGs and the theft of metals. AIBs have developed their own information-sharing agreements with partners and these are often highly effective in tackling local issues that have a level 2 impact. Examples include Operation Wilson (graffiti equipment supply) and Operation Kraftwerk (metal theft).
- Dynamic intelligence sharing takes place between BTP and Home Office forces as required, with recent examples given for subjects linked to Operation Cobalt.

Work in progress

- As discussed above, the force is working towards MoPI compliance; however, timelines for the project remain unclear.

Area(s) for improvement

- While some of the relationships to share intelligence between partners are governed by data-sharing agreements, some are not and therefore tend to rely on working relationships between individuals. Generally this pragmatic arrangement works, but it nevertheless presents a risk to BTP as there is a need for a formalised and overarching

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structure to co-ordinate intelligence-sharing agreements in support of the FSA and the force strategic intelligence requirement.

Summary – The force’s profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is comprehensive and developing, and the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats are identified early.

Strengths

- BTP operates in a unique environment, policing a railway community that travels, works and touches upon the national rail network. The FSA incorporates a section dealing with the rail industry perspective in which emerging themes are discussed, including the results of passenger perception surveys.
- In terms of economic crime, the ECU has developed a comprehensive network of key partners involved in tackling this crime, including train operating companies (TOCs) and the banking sector, Staff have a detailed understanding of the OCGs that orchestrate this complex type of criminality.
- There is a developing awareness of vulnerable locations and communities for other crime types, notably cable theft, as a result of the sustained and dedicated work of Operation Drum.
- There is an awareness of potential OCG activity to recruit vulnerable individuals within the rail network and the force has a well-established professional standards and operational security regime.

Work in progress

- In addition to the good work of level 2 teams such as the ECU, there is extensive ongoing work to profile the railway community under the roll-out of BTP’s Neighbourhood Policing programme. This will not only enhance local problem-solving activity but will provide a clear intelligence dividend for IPE activity against major crime and serious and organised crime.

Area(s) for improvement

- The link between the FIB and AIBs needs to be clarified in terms of intelligence submission and dissemination. There is no explicit community intelligence function within the FIB and there is a need to ensure that the effective partnership collaboration occurring at area level, particularly with the emergent Neighbourhood Policing teams, is informing the corporate intelligence picture at level 2. The impact on this area of the proposed restructuring of the FIB is unclear at this time.

Summary – The force strategic risk register is reviewed every six months by the chief officer group. Each department maintains a strategic risk register with all identified risks having an effective action plan, which are robustly monitored and controlled. Risks are escalated via the ACC (crime) for consideration by the chief officer group, as appropriate.

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Strengths

- The risk register is comprehensive, robust and fit for purpose, and includes risks for the force, specialist units and areas. It is integrated with the high-level NIM process, business planning and the resource allocation process and includes action plans intended to mitigate the stated risk. The force risk register is reviewed every six months as part of the force strategic tasking and co-ordination process.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force is creating ways of collaborating with all Home Office forces to provide the same level of access and interrogation across the UK. The force can demonstrate that its intelligence products are informed by a range of sources, including partners (eg multi-agency public protection arrangements) and other law enforcement agencies.

Strengths

- BTP uses the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES, Version 11) for its major inquiries and complex level 2 investigations. While there is no automated link with the force intelligence system, BTP systematically transfers intelligence to it from HOLMES.
- As discussed above, there are intelligence-sharing arrangements in place with Home Office forces, railway-specific bodies and the banking sector. The force also supports the RIU structure through dedicated and embedded staff.

Work in progress

- As discussed above, there is ongoing activity to seek inclusion in the national IMPACT project.

Area(s) for improvement

- There are interoperability issues within internal BTP IT systems that limit the scope of available intelligence. Search capability across specific data, including forensic and incident data, has been enabled; however, this is spreadsheet-based and increases duplication of activity. Refinement of internal systems, including HOLMES, would greatly inform and enhance external contribution at level 2 and level 3.
- As discussed above, there is a need for a formalised and overarching structure to co-ordinate intelligence-sharing agreements in support of the FSA and the force strategic intelligence requirement.

Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates adequately to deliver suitable responses that manage the threat from serious and organised

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criminality. The force can demonstrate that proactive resources are deployed predominantly through the tasking process, and that a clear set of priorities underpins tasking decisions.

Strengths

- The force TTCG is chaired by the ACC (crime), meets monthly, is attended by all key heads of departments and areas, and is informed by the force security group and TTCG meetings held in each area.
- Serious and organised crime issues are escalated to the force TTCG meeting in the form of bids for resources/assets and a detailed operational update is given by specialist team leads on level 2 priority crimes. All bids are considered on their merits and against the force control strategy themes, with urgent submissions made outside the force TTCG process and ratified thereafter. All resourcing decisions are documented through this process.

Work in progress

- Staff report that the force TTCG could provide greater direction and performance focus on activity against serious and organised crime at both level 1 and level 2. BTP has recognised this and is seeking to address the issue through the agreed restructuring. With the anticipated greater capacity at level 2, the force should consider moving to more frequent meetings with an enhanced focus on the role of the FIB to drive corporate activity against force control strategy priorities.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The measurement and assessment of harm and threat to communities are conducted through the force application of NIM systems and their associated products. This methodology is considered to be in need of development and greater clarity of roles between the FIB and AIBs is required.

Strengths

- Community intelligence is principally submitted by basic command unit (BCU) staff engaged on area response and the new Neighbourhood Policing teams, the product of which is analysed alongside other data (eg signal crimes and partnership data) by AIBs.
- Problem profiles are generated as required, which measure and assess potential harm and/or threats to communities. These are shared with the FIB where appropriate.
- Within the arena of economic crime, signal crime/activity is often more difficult to recognise. The ECU has therefore developed an effective screening mechanism to review suspicious activity reports (SARs) received from the financial industry alongside regular ticket vending machine (TVM) data received from banking institutions. The emerging harm or threat is assessed within the various NIM products generated for consideration within the ECU and is escalated to the force TTCG as necessary.

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Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- As discussed above, the link between the FIB and AIBs needs to be clarified to ensure effective upward flow of intelligence from areas, to inform level 2 activity.

Summary – Given the nature of the threat to the force area, the force has invested significantly in a serious and organised crime team. If confronted by an exceptional level of demand, the contingency plan is to supplement intelligence functions from other parts of the force, either through gold groups or through informal mechanisms. There are limited formal collaborative arrangements in place with Home Office forces to share resources in extreme circumstances.

Strengths

- BTP has established units dedicated to serious and organised crime and major crime. On occasions of exceptional major crime demand, additional resources will be marshalled through a gold group formed to oversee a specific investigation. At other times, when exceptional proactive or intelligence requirements exist for serious and organised crime, these will normally be expedited through the existing force TTCG processes.

Work in progress

- The force has recognised that it faces a challenge regarding its capacity for undertaking major crime and serious and organised crime investigations. Adherence to force policy on resourcing from areas is poor and often proves a major distraction to the senior investigating officer (SIO) in the critical early stages of an inquiry. The force has agreed plans to develop a national crime team with enhanced staffing of both investigative and HOLMES management functions. The launch of this team is planned for 1 July 2008 and will be accompanied by a new abstraction policy for areas. This policy will require the area with geographic responsibility for the crime to provide a criminal investigation department supervisor and will give the area resourcing responsibility to support the inquiry in the early stages. There will be a need for the relevant gold group to actively manage resourcing; however, it is anticipated that the new policy will enhance the initial response and will deliver a more sustainable position as the inquiry develops.

Area(s) for improvement

- There are few formal collaborative agreements in place with Home Office forces for serious and organised crime and major crime. Informal understandings exist with Home Office forces covering both the investigative primacy of major crime and a range of proactive tactical support measures. These, however, are often negotiated at unit or individual level and are not documented or maintained corporately. This presents a significant risk to the force should key individuals move on.

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Summary – Threats that cross force boundaries are managed by participation in the London regional TTCG. In addition, regular and fast-track informal contact exists with the relevant Home Office forces.

Strengths

- BTP participates in the regional TTCG process via the London RIU. In addition, the force enjoys effective and supportive working relationships with its colleagues in Home Office forces at both area level and within level 2 specialist teams. These relationships are often utilised as a fast-time response to emerging threats on a case-by-case basis.
- The force makes a positive contribution to the London RIU and has two staff permanently based within this team. The force regularly provides intelligence products in support of RIU activity and the quality of these products is satisfactory.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force evidences some solid systems consistent with a learning organisation but has a limited review policy. The absence of a dedicated review team to promote and learn from serious and organised crime investigations has proven to be an omission in the continuing development of the force.

Strengths

- BTP has an established review policy and has conducted a number of internal reviews of major crime in the last year, engaging external support on one occasion (Operation Cobalt). Learning from this review was disseminated via the chief officer group to SMT leads.
- There is a cadre of review course trained staff within BTP; however no dedicated resources exist to conduct reviews.

Work in progress

- The force chief officer group has committed to review the existing BTP crime review policy and associated resource levels. The new national crime team will undertake a quality assurance role through the daily review of major crime response as well as delivering an investigative and cold case review regime. Consideration is being given to integrating regular external review into this process to maximise organisational learning opportunities. It is unclear at this time the extent to which this will extend to serious and organised crime. The new arrangements are planned to be in place by 1 May 2008, with accompanying guidance to staff.

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Area(s) for improvement

- The force should maximise the learning opportunities from reviews of serious and organised crime investigations by ensuring that some reviews are independently conducted by other forces.

Prevention

Summary – The inspection found that preventative action was regularly considered during tasking and co-ordination processes, and the force has untested systematic mechanisms to assess the impact of such activity against OCGs. The force displays a weak understanding of disruption and dismantling methodologies.

Strengths

- The FSA and control strategy incorporate the range of IPE activity necessary under each priority, which follows an analysis of intelligence and crime patterns. This provides a framework for the monthly force tactical assessment, which recommends preventative action to address emerging threats and risks. In terms of serious and organised crime, it is also informed by the work of the areas and the level 1 TTCG process.
- BTP has been successful in its disruption of some OCGs that are engaged in economic crime as their primary type of criminality. In the performance year 2007/08, the force has conducted 36 operations against OCGs, including initiatives to tackle ATM crime, TVM fraud and cable theft (eg Operations Bright, Flatline and Drum).

Work in progress

- BTP is improving its understanding of the OCGs that are responsible for level 2 priority crime and has developed good mapping products that have identified some 53 active OCGs to date.
- The force has recently adopted a definition of ‘disruption’ of OCGs that will enable baseline assessment and enhanced performance focus on this area in 2008/09. A clear shared understanding of disrupting and dismantling methodologies for OCGs has yet to develop; however, this new measure and an associated focus through existing performance and NIM processes will broaden understanding in this area.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – There is evidence of established partnerships with statutory and non-statutory crime reduction partners including local Home Office forces, rail industry bodies and the banking sector. Partnership meetings evidence a full range of activity to deploy preventative measures.

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Strengths

- Each FSA level 2 priority crime has a control strategy and lead officer. Within each, there are objectives relating to external partnership and the promotion of joint working in relation to IPE activities.
- There are established partnerships in place with Home Office forces via the regional TTCG, and at area level via the level 1 TTCG. In addition, BTP has developed international partnerships to tackle eastern European OCG activity (Operation Golf). A range of other statutory partners are engaged by BTP in prevention activity, including Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, the Serious Fraud Office and the Department for Work and Pensions.
- BTP has close partnerships with rail industry bodies and passenger groups at both strategic and tactical level. Rail industry representatives participate in the level 1 TTCG and are engaged regularly at level 2 on preventative matters.
- BTP has a strategic-level National Independent Advisory Network that offers advice and community perspectives on policy issues. In addition there is a London-based independent advisory network, which offers guidance and insight on tactical matters. This was recently evidenced in Operation Aura, when advice was sought on ways to reach the gay community following a murder.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force demonstrated that professional standards issues are always considered in operational planning. There is a comprehensive security policy in place and in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted, commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The force has a dedicated force security manager and operational security officer who oversee all aspects of the force security management programme. These roles report on the state of the force's intelligence operations and produce the annual formal report on operational security actions taken throughout the year, highlighting remedial actions taken and developing strategic policies as required, in order to maintain chief officers' awareness of intelligence issues within the force.
- The professional standards department produces its own risk assessment, control strategy and tactical assessment and has a proactive and investigative capability.
- There is a clear and comprehensive vetting structure that is adhered to and maintained effectively. The professional standards department has responsibility for all force vetting in accordance with a force policy on the subject, which follows national guidelines. Staff and police authority members are vetted to the level commensurate with their role and individuals have their vetting status removed when appropriate.

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- There are robust and clear processes in place for operational security and covert policing, including witness protection and undercover/test purchase activity.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability, supported by on-demand covert resources. The force operates to a policy that is promulgated to and understood by dedicated staff only. The force is partially collaborating with other forces and partners.

Strengths

- BTP is part of the regional witness protection group (with the MPS, CoLP and SOCA) and complies with the National Memorandum of Understanding on witness protection. There is an identified single point of contact for witness protection matters.
- The force has a limited capacity to manage low-risk witness protection matters and collaborative arrangements exist with the MPS to manage any higher-risk cases should circumstances warrant it.
- There are ‘special measures’ arrangements in place at court to enable the Crown Prosecution Service to apply for the protection of individuals and offer anonymity.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- While specialist knowledge of witness protection is apparent within BTP, there is currently no formal policy framework in place to govern this issue corporately and no dedicated budget or resources available for such matters. While there have been few occasions that warrant such action, such a policy would formalise the existing collaborative arrangements and ensure suitable resilience in the absence of the single point of contact.

Summary – The force’s policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented.

Strengths

- Officers have given Osman warnings in accordance with national guidelines; this was demonstrated within specialist units and at area level. Warnings have been given during the past 12 months and recorded on the force intelligence system.

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- In practice, if a threat-to-life situation was encountered under Osman, specialist staff generally knew to contact the on-call SIO for advice. Knowledge outside specialists was limited.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- There is no central recording of Osman warnings and the force should consider developing such a function in order to ensure corporate memory on this issue.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that investigations were managed to medium levels of compliance to national and force standards. The review process is unstructured, although units do hold regular debriefs. Results of these debriefs are shared with partners where appropriate.

Strengths

- Within the crime department, the teams that handle serious and organised crime are the major crime team, the organised crime team and the ECU. These teams operate a structured approach to the management of investigations and combine assets and skills as necessary (eg for homicide or TVM fraud).
- The organised crime team manages serious and organised crime and focuses primarily on metal and cable theft under Operation Drum. The team comprises one detective chief inspector, two detective inspectors (DIs), three detective sergeants (DSs) and 20 police constables (PCs) and detective constables (DCs). This team undertakes both investigative and overt preventative duties. The serious and organised crime team also monitors the value/cost of, and undertakes operational activity against, Class A drugs.
- The ECU handles a high volume of serious and organised crime, with dedicated teams for financial investigation (one DS and five DCs/PCs), credit card fraud (one DS and two DCs/PCs) and commercial fraud (one DS and six DCs/PCs). It operates a 'triage' system, with cases initially assessed against documented case acceptance criteria. Once accepted, cases are allocated to one of the investigative teams.
- To support these teams there is also a covert crime function providing surveillance capacity, undercover capacity and high-tech crime support.
- Investigations are subject to an initial scoping exercise to determine the investigative and resource parameters and, thereafter, ECU line managers routinely review each case on a weekly basis.
- HOLMES is utilised in a number of serious and organised crime investigations at the discretion of the relevant SIO. These inquiries are entered on HOLMES as Category D investigations.
- Regular internal debriefs occur for major crime and serious and organised crime within the crime department, and the results are shared with relevant partners when

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appropriate. Recent examples include TVM fraud, where the ECU has worked closely with Transport for London; and Operation Drum. Extensive preventative activity has been conducted with train operators and the scrap metal industry.

Work in progress

- The force chief officer group has recognised that it faces a challenge to meet its existing crime review policy and associated resource levels. The force has agreed plans to develop a national crime team with enhanced staffing of both investigative and HOLMES management functions by 1 July 2008. This new team will undertake a quality assurance role through the daily review of major crime and serious and organised crime response, as well as delivering an investigative and cold case review regime. Consideration is being given to integrating regular external review into this process to maximise organisational learning opportunities. The new arrangements are planned to be in place by 1 May 2008, with accompanying guidance to staff.
- As discussed, the force has recently adopted a disruption measure for OCGs.

Area(s) for improvement

- There are concerns regarding the organisational capacity to service demand for Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) seizures. (See below)

Summary – The proactive use of POCA is sometimes considered by this force as a preventative tool in support of attacks against OCGs. The force has an action plan to respond to HMIC’s thematic report *Payback Time* which can best be described as systematic and robust.

Strengths

- The ECU takes the lead on all forms of POCA activity within the force, under the overall guidance of the ACC (crime), who is POCA champion for the force. The unit does not confine itself solely to financial crime, but provides a service to specialist teams and areas. This unit demonstrates a high level of skill and experience in asset confiscation, cash seizure/forfeiture and money-laundering prosecutions. POCA powers are used as a tactic to target offenders at all NIM levels whenever possible, although the force is constrained by capacity. In the performance year 2007/08, the force used POCA to seize a total of £968,468 at NIM levels 1 and 2.
- The ECU reviews every SAR that is referred to the force. These SARs are assessed and investigative activity is commissioned as required.

Work in progress

- The force has recognised that it faces a capacity problem for financial investigation. The growing awareness and usage of POCA powers have seen greater demand for support in this area, and the ongoing OCG mapping/profiling will increase demand. The force is developing a pilot initiative for area-based financial investigators that will provide greater resilience on POCA issues and should prove particularly beneficial for cash seizures. Currently, four of the six force areas are supporting this initiative and the pilot requires greater corporate drive and urgency to ensure that opportunities to disrupt OCGs are not lost.

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Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Enforcement

Summary – The force is highly focused on targets that impact on the force control strategy and intelligence requirement. A risk management process is consistently applied to the impact of each operation against OCGs.

Strengths

- The BTP FSA sets the control strategy priorities and their associated targets. Serious and organised crime features within the FSA and is a clear theme across the six level 2 priority crimes. Each priority is owned by a chief officer or SMT lead and activities are monitored through an established and mature performance management framework.
- All decisions taken at the force TTCG are linked to the control strategy priorities, and emergent IPE themes and risks are pursued through the group.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – Inspection teams found a comprehensive specialist capability in force for intelligence management, enforcement and prevention activity with corresponding governance and support infrastructure. Collaborative arrangements are in place with partners where required, but these are often informal in nature.

Strengths

- With the exception of those areas noted above, the force specialist units generally have sufficient capacity and capability to meet predicted demand without undue abstraction from areas. They are available for dynamic tasking, and compliance with the force tasking and co-ordination process is effective.
- BTP has a dedicated mobile surveillance team of one DI, two DSs and 16 DCs. This unit has static, foot, mobile and covert rural observations post (CROPS) capacity. There is no armed surveillance capability but a collaborative arrangement is in place with the MPS to provide this when required.
- The force has a dedicated source unit of one DI, one DS and three DCs regularly tasked in support of control strategy priorities. The force has trained undercover and test purchase officers who are deployable.
- There is a dedicated high-tech crime unit with one DS and two DCs that is under the same line management as the scientific support unit (SSU), so as to maximise forensic

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capability in this specialist work. The SSU comprises four crime scene co-ordinators (the head of scenes of crime and three senior crime scene examiners), seven crime scene managers and 21 crime scene examiners. BTP also has a dedicated fingerprint bureau and chemical analysis laboratory. A collaborative agreement exists with CoLP for mutual assistance when required.

- HOLMES (Version 11) is deployed on major crime and large organised crime inquiries. There is a dedicated team of eight staff trained in the use of HOLMES.
- BTP has a cadre of 53 trained family liaison officers (FLOs) and each area has one FLO co-ordinator. FLOs are called out based upon their specialism and availability, or on a rotational basis. There is comprehensive welfare support for FLOs.

Work in progress

- As discussed above, BTP is proposing to reform the current structure for serious and organised crime and major crime; this is led by the ACC (crime). If successfully implemented, the proposed new structure will further enhance investigative and intelligence capacity. It is anticipated that this reform will be in place by 1 July 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- The ECU reports frustration at the suitability of its existing case management system to run the often complex investigations it undertakes. The unit does, however, have both the access and capability to run HOLMES-based inquiries. Forces elsewhere have found the system suitably flexible to meet their needs and the force may wish to consult with CoLP, which has significant experience of using HOLMES in this regard.
- Currently, all sources within BTP are controlled by the centrally based DI within the dedicated source unit, while there is a cadre of qualified handlers in areas. Staff, both centrally and on areas, report frustration that current arrangements are too remote and inflexible. This may be reflected in the growth in the use of confidential contacts on some areas. The force should consider guidance and compliance on the use of sources and confidential contacts, to ensure corporacy.
- Estate strategy is a major challenge for BTP at all levels. Within the specialist teams, staff report frustration at existing accommodation and storage facilities, in particular in the ECU. These issues should contribute to the ongoing crime review.

Summary – The force has agreements with Home Office forces for the investigation of serious, organised and major crime and support for specialist services. These collaborations are considered to be practical.

Strengths

- The force has close working relationships with Home Office forces and crime and disorder reduction partnership partners at a local level. These have been formalised in many areas through the recent roll-out of Neighbourhood Policing and these contacts are available to specialist teams.
- As discussed above, the force participates in the London RIU and has access to MPS and CoLP resources through this structure.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- BTP has a range of standing collaborative relationships in place with Home Office forces to obtain specialist support; however, these arrangements are often informal and ad hoc in nature. There is a requirement for these existing collaborative arrangements to be formalised to ensure that BTP has the necessary resilience to undertake specialist tactics such as armed surveillance and also at times of exceptional demand (eg kidnap or Category A homicide).

Performance management and resilience

Summary – Governance of assets and activity for this area of policing by the ACPO lead and police authority is thorough.

Strengths

- The ACC (crime) is responsible for serious and organised crime issues in the force and is closely engaged with the strategy to target OCGs. He provides regular reports to the police authority on these issues, normally in the non-public element of the meeting. More detailed briefings are given to individual police authority leads, who, for serious and organised crime, have been vetted to the appropriate level.
- The unique operating and funding environment of BTP requires an additional consideration of the rail industry perspective on policing activity and resource management. In this regard, BTP consults extensively and regularly at strategic and tactical level and this is reflected in their FSA and crime policies such as the violence reduction plan.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – Force performance in the identification, assessment and management of OCGs is being developed to incorporate reviews of each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- Within the crime department, investigations are reviewed at the weekly SMT meetings, and bespoke performance criteria are set for investigations that concern serious and organised criminality.

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- There are basic performance measures in place that reflect the force's core business and many of the desired outputs and outcomes (eg sanction detection rates and POCA orders made).

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- As discussed above, BTP has made progress in developing a measure for OCG disruptions. This needs to be built upon in order to include management information that assesses OCG threats and tactical options considered against cost and impact.

Summary – The inspection found evidence of sufficient capacity and processes to maintain delivery against serious and organised criminality. This included an acceptable investigative policy and workforce succession plan. The notable exception to this standard was insufficient analytical capacity.

Strengths

- The resource disposition within the crime department is broadly proportionate to the current demand for the investigation of serious and organised crime, including the provision of specialist assets to support investigations on BCUs. This includes the abstraction of detective officers from BCUs for major inquiries, and a range of proactive assets such as a surveillance capability, CROPS officers, FLOs, the SSU, the dedicated source unit, the high-tech crime unit and trained undercover officers.
- Staff identified to resource major incident teams and major incident rooms are trained to the major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) standard. Decisions to deploy these assets are taken by the force TTCG, the gold group (if applicable) or, in urgent cases, by the detective chief superintendent or on-call SIO.
- Policy logs are opened for all serious and/or high-risk investigations, with policies and decisions recorded therein.
- All staff in the crime department have role profiles specific to their function and/or specialism. Staff generally described their investigative workload as manageable and acceptable, with investigative supervision available and routinely practised.

Work in progress

- As discussed above, BTP is proposing to reform the current structure for serious and organised crime and major crime; this is being led by ACC (crime).

Area(s) for improvement

- BTP needs to develop its skills base and succession planning for skills that appertain to serious and organised crime. This should include a policy on multi-skilling (ie defining compatible skill sets, etc) and thereby provide the necessary resilience and continuity required for this key area of business.

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- Greater corporacy is required around the development and formalisation of collaborative arrangements with Home Office forces.

Summary – The inspection found that the force was fully compliant with relevant ACPO standards and guidance for deployed specialist assets.

Strengths

- The covert policing and related ACPO manuals of guidance are accessible to staff on a 24/7 basis via the force intranet system. BTP policy on covert policing is compliant with the ACPO standards and there were no incidences of breaches.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
AIB	area intelligence bureau
ATM	automatic teller machine

B

BCU	basic command unit
BTP	British Transport Police
BTPA	British Transport Police Authority

C

CoLP	City of London Police
CROPS	Covert Rural Observations Post

D

DC	detective constable
DfT	Department for Transport
DI	detective inspector
DS	detective sergeant

E

ECU	economic crime unit
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F

FHQ	force headquarters
FIB	force intelligence bureau
FLO	family liaison officer
FOC	freight operating company
FSA	force strategic assessment

H

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

I

IMPACT	intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking
IPE	intelligence, prevention and enforcement
IT	information technology

M

MoPI	management of police information
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service

N

NIM	National Intelligence Model
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O

OCG	organised crime group
Osman	Osman v UK (1999) 1 FLR 193, where the court established that in certain circumstances the state has a positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect an individual who is at risk from the criminal activities of others

P

PC	police constable
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

R

RIU	regional intelligence unit
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S

SAR	suspicious activity report
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SMT	senior management team
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SPI	statutory performance indicator
SSU	scientific support unit

T

TOC train operating company

TTCG tactical tasking and co-ordination group

TVM ticket vending machine